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<title><![CDATA[Special Issue Photos]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/4/356?rss=1</link>
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<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09348413</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Special Issue Photos]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>356</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>356</prism:startingPage>
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<title><![CDATA[Editor's Introduction]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/4/357?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Warfield Rawls, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09344377</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Editor's Introduction]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>370</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>357</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/371?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[John Rawls on Two Concepts of Rules: Some Speculations about Their Ecological Validity in Behavioral and Social Science Research]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/371?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Over fifty years have passed since the publication of John Rawls&rsquo; paper &lsquo;Two Concepts of Rules&rsquo; (1955). The paper remains a unique work. Rawls&rsquo; seminal &lsquo;distinction between justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it&rsquo; (1955: 3) provides us with a powerful analytic proposition that can have extensive theoretical and empirical consequences for the social sciences, as I seek to demonstrate below. In footnote 1 on page 3, Rawls states that &lsquo;practice&rsquo; is a technical term that refers to &lsquo;any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure. As examples one may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments.&rsquo; Rawls&rsquo; philosophical objective was to defend utilitarianism vis-&agrave;-vis &lsquo;punishment and the obligations to keep promises.&rsquo; The general idea was to provide a clearer understanding of a rule regardless of whether or not it is defensible. The notion of two conceptions of rules is central to his discussion. I ask: can Rawls&rsquo; unique analytical notion of two concepts of rules be clarified by empirical research in the social sciences? I present some recent data from a criminal justice case to illustrate the notion&rsquo;s potential and limitations. The empirical circumstances are somewhat dramatic. The case involved an allegation of inter-racial sexual molestation and two counts of Grand Theft. The sexual molestation allegation is a theme at the heart of deep-seated cultural tensions between Caucasians and African Americans that can be traced back to initial importation of slaves from Africa. The inter-racial sexual molestation allegation was documented in detail by two law-enforcement agencies but was never pursued. Once major consequence of this decision was to render empirically problematic the issue of when a case is said to fall under a rule of law.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Cicourel, A. V.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09344448</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[John Rawls on Two Concepts of Rules: Some Speculations about Their Ecological Validity in Behavioral and Social Science Research]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>387</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>371</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Rule-Following, Rule-Governance and Rule-Accord: Reflections on Rules after Rawls]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/389?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this discussion, I describe my introduction to Rawls&rsquo; famous paper on rules and situate this in a broader intellectual context. I then attempt to locate its significance within developments in linguistics (especially in speech-act analysis) and also in ethnomethodology. My main idea is that Rawls&rsquo; concept of a &lsquo;constitutive rule&rsquo; is in deep harmony with many of Wittgenstein&rsquo;s insights into the same thematic.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Coulter, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09344449</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Rule-Following, Rule-Governance and Rule-Accord: Reflections on Rules after Rawls]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>403</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>389</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/405?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Two Concepts of Attachment to Rules]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/405?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this paper, we discuss some implications of John Rawls&rsquo; paper &lsquo;Two Concepts of Rules&rsquo; (1955) for social science. We argue that Rawls&rsquo; notion of &lsquo;practice&rsquo; is not a straightforward contribution to sociological theory, but rather re-orients the idea of what understanding social actions might be. We explicate how Rawls&rsquo; distinction between &lsquo;summary&rsquo; and &lsquo;practice&rsquo; views of rules might play out in approaching mathematical practice and mathematical expressions. We argue that social constructivists like Bloor hold on to a &lsquo;summary&rsquo; conception of rules while Wittgenstein adopts the more radical &lsquo;practice&rsquo; conception.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greiffenhagen, C., Sharrock, W.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09344450</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Two Concepts of Attachment to Rules]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>427</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>405</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/429?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Reflections on 'Two Concepts of Rules']]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/429?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Biographical materials are used to describe the influences of John Rawls&rsquo; paper &lsquo;Two Concepts of Rules&rsquo; (1955) on my sociological work. The topics of my concern &mdash; the phenomenology of the interview, language games and their organizational context; police practices and information technologies as well as qualitative methods &mdash; were directly and indirectly shaped by reading the paper early in my career. While my work remains organizational, the importance of context on meaning and the resultant practices are the background that drives my research.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Manning, P. K.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09344451</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Reflections on 'Two Concepts of Rules']]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>449</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>429</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/450?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Rules and Details: From Wittgenstein and Rawls to the Study of Practices]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/450?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This paper first recalls the way the distinction John Rawls introduced between &lsquo;summary&rsquo; and &lsquo;practice&rsquo; conceptions of rules was presented and taken up in French thought in the 1990s. Then, expanding on Rawls&rsquo; characterization of Wittgenstein&rsquo;s considerations on rule following and discussing several criticisms it aroused, it comes to the conclusion that &lsquo;rule&rsquo; is a notion that is inadequate to explain either social action or the way people justify what they have done. It thus argues that to account for the emergence of the mutual intelligibility enabling action in common to emerge and develop, one should dispense with the notion of rule and substitute the notion of detail of ordinary action for it. To support this claim, the paper takes on a question: what does a detail do? The answer it offers suggests that each detail of an ongoing action &mdash; when empirically identified in actual circumstances of interaction &mdash; should be conceived of as a building block of practical reasoning allowing for a sociological inquiry of a phenomenon: coordination of action, that is, the sequential activity which makes an action the kind of action it is.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ogien, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09344452</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Rules and Details: From Wittgenstein and Rawls to the Study of Practices]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>474</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>450</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/475?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Constitutive Practices and Garfinkel's Notion of Trust: Revisited]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/475?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This article is intended to reinstate, in at least a prefatory way, some ethnomethodological (EM) considerations concerning trust. The idea of constitutive practices &mdash; as it was taken up in Garfinkel&rsquo;s sociology &mdash; turned on trust as a background condition for mutually intelligible action. Starting with a consideration of Garfinkel&rsquo;s 1963 study of trust, the article critically considers some formal analytic alternates to his approach. The aspects of trust that are &lsquo;elusive&rsquo; to the formal-analytic approach are shown to result from its allusive treatment by formal analysis. In Garfinkel&rsquo;s hands trust is not elusive. The critique of formal analytic studies builds on Garfinkel&rsquo;s writings and certain strands of analytic and ordinary language philosophy. These sources ground the author&rsquo;s suggestion that the study of trust be taken up again, albeit along respecified analytic lines. Examples are given, both of an EM and conversation-analytic (CA) kind.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Watson, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09344453</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Constitutive Practices and Garfinkel's Notion of Trust: Revisited]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>499</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>475</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/500?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[An Essay on Two Conceptions of Social Order: Constitutive Orders of Action, Objects and Identities vs Aggregated Orders of Individual Action]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/4/500?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>I argue that there is a deep parallel between problems that John Rawls (1955) argued had developed in moral philosophy as a result of not recognizing the difference between two conceptions of rules, and problems that have developed in sociology as a result of not recognizing that there are two conceptions of social order. That most philosophers and sociologists have not appreciated this problem does not weaken the importance of the argument. In fact, I think that the misunderstandings which have resulted from lack of attention to constitutive practices, with research and policy implications effecting social, legal and justice issues in modern society, strengthen the original argument considerably.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rawls, A. W.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09344376</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[An Essay on Two Conceptions of Social Order: Constitutive Orders of Action, Objects and Identities vs Aggregated Orders of Individual Action]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>4</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>520</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>500</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/291?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Market, Values and Coordination of Actions: From Value Integration to Libertas Indifferentiae]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/291?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The aim of this article is to contribute to the discussion about the social functions of the market. I am interested in the special kind of social order the social interaction in the market produces, which has been mostly ignored in sociology. In the first part I look for historical reasons for the peripheral role of the market in sociological analysis. My argument in this regard is that this omission of the economic realm becomes more understandable if one takes into consideration not only the prerequisite of entrance into the academic field, namely not to step on the toes of older and more established fields of research, but also the very ambivalent and, in some strands of social thought, even openly hostile attitude to the market. The second part of the paper presents two paradigmatic but problematic cases of a sociological analysis of the economic realm: &Eacute;mile Durkheim's views and Talcott Parsons' early conception of a society&mdash;economy relationship. In the third part I figure out another way to think about the role of the market in society from a standpoint that accepts the centrality of aspects such as values and norms in social life. I do not, however, postulate a societal value consensus at large, but see the economic sphere itself to be the source of those stabilizing mechanisms. As a starting point I use Talcott Parsons' theory of communication media and the concept of social order it implicitly contains. It offers possibilities for finding connections to earlier discussions of the social functions of the market, labelled `commercial ideology', referring to eighteenth-century social thought. With my discussion I hope to show that interactions in the market have wider ramifications for social order, while the market produces its own distinct kind of order not captured by the dichotomy of value vs. interest-based actions and orders so common in sociology.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kangas, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 16 Jul 2009 07:21:02 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09105445</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Market, Values and Coordination of Actions: From Value Integration to Libertas Indifferentiae]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>318</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>291</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/319?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Mannheim Hypothesis Revisited: Conservatism versus the Principle of Liberty and Liberal Modernity]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/319?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This paper revisits the classical sociological hypothesis of conservatism, specifically the `Mannheim Hypothesis,' and its bearing on liberty or liberal modernity. The original formulation of the Mannheim Hypothesis posits that conservatism tends to oppose the `principle of liberty' and, hence, liberal modernity or liberalism, defined as its immediate antagonist. This paper presents the Mannheim Hypothesis of conservatism and liberty, as well as its initial general solution by Mannheim and other classical sociologists. Then it attempts to solve this hypothesis by presenting relevant theoretical arguments and supporting empirical evidence. Overall this essay reaffirms the classical sociological solution of the Mannheim Hypothesis of conservatism and liberty in contemporary society.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zafirovshi, M., Rodeheaver, D. G.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 16 Jul 2009 07:21:02 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09105446</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Mannheim Hypothesis Revisited: Conservatism versus the Principle of Liberty and Liberal Modernity]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>335</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>319</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/337?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Economics, Politics and Sociology: On the Contribution of Galbraith's Unconventional Wisdom to the Discourse of Classical Sociology]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/3/337?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Classical sociology is generally equated with analyses of late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century thinkers whose writings ranged seamlessly across what, subsequently, would become differentiated fields of inquiry. One twentieth-century analyst whose texts replicate aspects of the works of the classical sociologists is J.K. Galbraith, a figure whose disciplinary home is conventionally considered to be economics, but whose writings transcend disciplinary boundaries to explore the articulation of economic, social and political phenomena. Galbraith's studies, addressing such matters as increasing inequality and growing economic insecurity; the cultivation and management of consumer demand; the imbalance between private consumption and public provision; and the growth in military and defence expenditure, continue to be of contemporary relevance and warrant a prominent place within sociology.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Smart, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 16 Jul 2009 07:21:02 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09105447</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Economics, Politics and Sociology: On the Contribution of Galbraith's Unconventional Wisdom to the Discourse of Classical Sociology]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>346</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>337</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/3/347?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Review Essay: Profit of Innovation?: Schumpeter and Classical Sociology]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/3/347?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ray, L.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Thu, 16 Jul 2009 07:21:02 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09105448</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Review Essay: Profit of Innovation?: Schumpeter and Classical Sociology]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>3</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>352</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-08-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>347</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/187?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Weber/Simmel/Du Bois: Musical Thirds of Classical Sociology]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/187?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Three classics of sociology are discussed for how they treat music as a social symptom of modernity's rationalization process, as a conceptual model of modern sociality, and as a generic resource for sociological writing. Where parts of Max Weber's <I>The Rational and Social Foundations of Music</I> focus on the distinctive `ethos' of creative composition within the rise of modern music, passages in Georg Simmel's <I>Schopenhauer and Nietzsche</I> address the specific `logos' of modern performance as an autonomous expression of metaphysical will, and the final chapters of W.E.B. Du Bois's <I> The Souls of Black Folk</I> are concerned with the `pathos' of listening as a potential way of transcending social divisions. The social contexts, cultural contents, and personal motivations of these proto-sociologies of music are shown to articulate a contrapuntal or `lyrical' sociology which is attentive to the production, distribution, and consumption of cultural forms along with the harmonic, melodic, and rhythmic aspects of social life itself.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kemple, T. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 15 Apr 2009 07:15:03 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09102122</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Weber/Simmel/Du Bois: Musical Thirds of Classical Sociology]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>207</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>187</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/209?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Max Weber's Sociology of Law: Judge as Mediator]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/209?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The substantive underpinnings of Max Weber's `Sociology of Law' and the standing of judges therein are discussed. Foregrounding his conception of the administration of justice, perennial concern with the correlation between personality and the structure of domination, and account of legal rationalization, his discernment of the vital adjudicative role assumed by judges and the bearing of their personal qualifications is elucidated. The focus is placed on Weber's putatively negative assessment of the Common Law. Reading his appraisal of precedent and the charismatic stature of the judge in light of his theory of casuistry and critique of bureaucracy, it is shown that his examination implicitly extols the English administration of justice.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sahni, I.-P.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 15 Apr 2009 07:15:03 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09102123</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Max Weber's Sociology of Law: Judge as Mediator]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>233</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>209</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/234?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Karl Mannheim: A Case-Study in Textual Decline]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/234?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>How is it that some sociological texts can defy time and lay claim to be classics while others fall into obsolescence? The paper assumes that an adequate answer must include reference to discourse aims, how a text is written and reading effects. A comparison is made between the earlier (pre-1933) writings of Karl Mannheim and the later (post-1933) writings, with the aim of identifying qualities of the former that made them candidates for classic status and explaining why the latter, due to their instrumental aim, could not hope to achieve such status.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Green, B. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 15 Apr 2009 07:15:03 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09102124</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Karl Mannheim: A Case-Study in Textual Decline]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>259</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>234</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/260?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Overcoming Structure and Agency: Talcott Parsons, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Theory of Social Action]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/2/260?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Since the 1960s, the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein has had a marked influence on the social sciences. As an important sub-field, the sociology of science has drawn extensively on Wittgenstein and he has become a key reference point in debates in the philosophy of the social sciences about structure and agency. There, a number of commentators have employed Wittgenstein's `sceptical paradox' to demonstrate that the dualistic account of social reality provided by major figures in contemporary social theory such as Giddens, Bourdieu, Bhaskar and Habermas is unsustainable; it is individualist. This paper acknowledges the importance of Wittgenstein but maintains that a critique of contemporary social theory consonant with the `sceptical paradox' was already present in the sociological canon: in the form of Parsons' utilitarian dilemma in <I>The Structure of Social Action</I>. Accordingly, the utilitarian dilemma is recovered for current debates in order to demonstrate the enduring relevance of Parsons. Indeed, not only did Parsons provide a critique of individualism compatible with Wittgenstein's, but he actually transcended it.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[King, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Wed, 15 Apr 2009 07:15:03 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X09102125</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Overcoming Structure and Agency: Talcott Parsons, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Theory of Social Action]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>2</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>288</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-05-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>260</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/5?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Introduction to Tocqueville's `France before the Revolution' (1836)]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/5?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Swedberg, R.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 06:27:28 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X08098975</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Introduction to Tocqueville's `France before the Revolution' (1836)]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>15</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>5</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/17?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[France Before the Revolution]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/17?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[De Tocqueville, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 06:27:28 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X08098976</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[France Before the Revolution]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>66</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>17</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/67?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Gustave de Beaumont: Tocqueville's Darker Shadow?]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/67?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this article I argue that the work of Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont must be seen as one common comparative project in studying emerging modern democracies, just as one sees Marx and Engels as life-long collaborators in the critique of capitalism. In order to fully appreciate the finer details of this common project it is first necessary to acknowledge Gustave de Beaumont's genuine insights and contributions as they can be found in his letters and in his anti-slavery novel <I>Marie</I>. Tocqueville then comes to be seen as <I>primus inter pares</I> rather than the solitary genius as which he is normally portrayed.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hess, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 06:27:28 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X08098977</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Gustave de Beaumont: Tocqueville's Darker Shadow?]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>78</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>67</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/79?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Reflexive Exceptionalism: On the Relevance of Tocqueville's America for Modern China]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/79?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this paper I argue that a reflexive type of exceptionalism was articulated by the reformist elites in late imperial China as a cultural strategy to confront and appropriate the hegemonic representation of modern democratic power and Occidental civilization that was articulated on the basis of Tocqueville's exceptionalist image of America and imposed by Western imperialism. By delineating the temporal and normative structure of this reflexive exceptionalism and reconstructing the quasi-religious meanings of its myths and rituals, I propose that the motif of `Confucian religion' in the reformist study society movement should be understood in terms of its intent to produce and discipline a social power that could be mobilized for China's ideological and political competition with the West. While the movement ended in failure with the rise of a fundamentalist reaction, the fate of Chinese exceptionalism under the changing power structure of contemporary world society can be properly understood with reference to its historical origin and transformation.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chen, H.-F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 06:27:28 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X08098978</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Reflexive Exceptionalism: On the Relevance of Tocqueville's America for Modern China]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>95</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>79</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/97?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[An Exceptional Civilizing Process?]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/97?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The claim to a nation's `exceptionalism' can only be assessed in relation to a specific theory. This article discusses the history of the USA in the light of Norbert Elias's theory of civilizing (and decivilizing) processes. Although, unlike many Western European countries, the USA never had a single monopoly `model-setting elite' and had no nobility, it did have several competing aristocracies. The Northern <I>Bildungsb&uuml;rgertum</I> dominates perception of the USA at the expense of the Southern <I>Junkers</I>, whose political and cultural legacy nevertheless continues to be of great significance, notably in the comparatively high level of violence that afflicts present-day America. The peculiarities of state formation processes &mdash; the formation of a (relatively) effective monopoly of the legitimate use of violence &mdash; in the USA and their continuation in empire formation are examined. Ironically, the USA has become a model-setting elite for the whole world at a time when its popular egalitarianism represents a kind of false consciousness in a factually increasingly unequal society; when the USA may be undergoing a process of de-democratization; and when American misperceptions of the wider world, together with diminishing foresight by American governments, are becoming a serious problem in world politics.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mennell, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 06:27:28 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X08098979</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[An Exceptional Civilizing Process?]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>115</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>97</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/117?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Max Weber's Analysis of the Unique American Civic Sphere: Its Origins, Expansion, and Oscillations]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/117?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Max Weber's analysis of the American civic sphere has been seldom investigated. Indebted to the ascetic Protestantism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, his major concepts and analytic framework are summarized here. An unusual symbiotic dualism between the civic arena and a <I>world-mastery</I> individualism, as well as an antagonism between this value-grounded individualism and <I>practical-rational</I> individualism, remain pivotal throughout his analysis. Nonetheless, although powerful, the <I>Weberian</I> model is seen to be foreshortened. Three complementary constructs, grounded in his rich set of concepts, extend Weber's analysis. Taken in combination, all four models provide a Weberian analysis of the American civic sphere's unique origins, expansion, and past and present oscillations across a demarcated spectrum. Weber's emphasis upon the deep cultural contexts of social action, the influence of the past upon the present, and arrays of operationalizable hypotheses diverges distinctly from Tocqueville's approach, as well as present-day modernization, neo-functionalist, and neo-Marxist analyses of the civic sphere.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kalberg, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 06:27:28 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X08098980</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Max Weber's Analysis of the Unique American Civic Sphere: Its Origins, Expansion, and Oscillations]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>141</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>117</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/143?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[The Problem of `American Exceptionalism' Revisited]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/9/1/143?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this paper, I address the problem of the usefulness of the notion of American exceptionalism by examining the views of a number of classical theorists concerning the peculiarities of American history, emphasizing particularly its religious background. Ultimately, I follow Aristide Zolberg in arguing that there are as many `exceptionalisms' as there are cases under examination, and that the proper mode of studying these questions is unavoidably comparative and historical. Comparative historical analysis is the only means of determining what is typical and what is distinctive (not `deviant,' the invocation of which concept would inappropriately imply some sort of `norm'). Here, however, I will in the main compare only implicitly, highlighting particular features of American historical development while suggesting how these differ from other relevant cases, in an effort to make sense of how the United States can be at once a leading defender of human rights and a leading violator of such rights, as well as a vision of a prosperous future for many that at the same time is marked by striking and increasingly large inequalities of wealth and income.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Torpey, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 06:27:28 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X08098981</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[The Problem of `American Exceptionalism' Revisited]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>168</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>143</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/169?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Review Essay: America -- An Exceptional Modernity?: Talcott Parsons, American Society: A Theory of the Societal Community, Giuseppe Sciortino, ed. and introduction. Boulder, CO and London: Paradigm, 2007. ISBN 978--1-59451--227--8 (hbk)]]></title>
<link>http://jcs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/9/1/169?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Turner, B. S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Jan 2009 06:27:28 PST</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/1468795X08098982</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Review Essay: America -- An Exceptional Modernity?: Talcott Parsons, American Society: A Theory of the Societal Community, Giuseppe Sciortino, ed. and introduction. Boulder, CO and London: Paradigm, 2007. ISBN 978--1-59451--227--8 (hbk)]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>1</prism:number>
<prism:volume>9</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>179</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-02-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>169</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Article</prism:section>
</item>

</rdf:RDF>