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Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

Editor's Introduction

Warfield Rawls, A. — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

John Rawls on Two Concepts of Rules: Some Speculations about Their Ecological Validity in Behavioral and Social Science Research

Cicourel, A. V. — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

Over fifty years have passed since the publication of John Rawls’ paper ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955). The paper remains a unique work. Rawls’ seminal ‘distinction between justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it’ (1955: 3) provides us with a powerful analytic proposition that can have extensive theoretical and empirical consequences for the social sciences, as I seek to demonstrate below. In footnote 1 on page 3, Rawls states that ‘practice’ is a technical term that refers to ‘any form of activity specified by a system of rules which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives the activity its structure. As examples one may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments.’ Rawls’ philosophical objective was to defend utilitarianism vis-à-vis ‘punishment and the obligations to keep promises.’ The general idea was to provide a clearer understanding of a rule regardless of whether or not it is defensible. The notion of two conceptions of rules is central to his discussion. I ask: can Rawls’ unique analytical notion of two concepts of rules be clarified by empirical research in the social sciences? I present some recent data from a criminal justice case to illustrate the notion’s potential and limitations. The empirical circumstances are somewhat dramatic. The case involved an allegation of inter-racial sexual molestation and two counts of Grand Theft. The sexual molestation allegation is a theme at the heart of deep-seated cultural tensions between Caucasians and African Americans that can be traced back to initial importation of slaves from Africa. The inter-racial sexual molestation allegation was documented in detail by two law-enforcement agencies but was never pursued. Once major consequence of this decision was to render empirically problematic the issue of when a case is said to fall under a rule of law.

Rule-Following, Rule-Governance and Rule-Accord: Reflections on Rules after Rawls

Coulter, J. — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

In this discussion, I describe my introduction to Rawls’ famous paper on rules and situate this in a broader intellectual context. I then attempt to locate its significance within developments in linguistics (especially in speech-act analysis) and also in ethnomethodology. My main idea is that Rawls’ concept of a ‘constitutive rule’ is in deep harmony with many of Wittgenstein’s insights into the same thematic.

Two Concepts of Attachment to Rules

Greiffenhagen, C., Sharrock, W. — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

In this paper, we discuss some implications of John Rawls’ paper ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955) for social science. We argue that Rawls’ notion of ‘practice’ is not a straightforward contribution to sociological theory, but rather re-orients the idea of what understanding social actions might be. We explicate how Rawls’ distinction between ‘summary’ and ‘practice’ views of rules might play out in approaching mathematical practice and mathematical expressions. We argue that social constructivists like Bloor hold on to a ‘summary’ conception of rules while Wittgenstein adopts the more radical ‘practice’ conception.

Reflections on 'Two Concepts of Rules'

Manning, P. K. — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

Biographical materials are used to describe the influences of John Rawls’ paper ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955) on my sociological work. The topics of my concern — the phenomenology of the interview, language games and their organizational context; police practices and information technologies as well as qualitative methods — were directly and indirectly shaped by reading the paper early in my career. While my work remains organizational, the importance of context on meaning and the resultant practices are the background that drives my research.

Rules and Details: From Wittgenstein and Rawls to the Study of Practices

Ogien, A. — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

This paper first recalls the way the distinction John Rawls introduced between ‘summary’ and ‘practice’ conceptions of rules was presented and taken up in French thought in the 1990s. Then, expanding on Rawls’ characterization of Wittgenstein’s considerations on rule following and discussing several criticisms it aroused, it comes to the conclusion that ‘rule’ is a notion that is inadequate to explain either social action or the way people justify what they have done. It thus argues that to account for the emergence of the mutual intelligibility enabling action in common to emerge and develop, one should dispense with the notion of rule and substitute the notion of detail of ordinary action for it. To support this claim, the paper takes on a question: what does a detail do? The answer it offers suggests that each detail of an ongoing action — when empirically identified in actual circumstances of interaction — should be conceived of as a building block of practical reasoning allowing for a sociological inquiry of a phenomenon: coordination of action, that is, the sequential activity which makes an action the kind of action it is.

Constitutive Practices and Garfinkel's Notion of Trust: Revisited

Watson, R. — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

This article is intended to reinstate, in at least a prefatory way, some ethnomethodological (EM) considerations concerning trust. The idea of constitutive practices — as it was taken up in Garfinkel’s sociology — turned on trust as a background condition for mutually intelligible action. Starting with a consideration of Garfinkel’s 1963 study of trust, the article critically considers some formal analytic alternates to his approach. The aspects of trust that are ‘elusive’ to the formal-analytic approach are shown to result from its allusive treatment by formal analysis. In Garfinkel’s hands trust is not elusive. The critique of formal analytic studies builds on Garfinkel’s writings and certain strands of analytic and ordinary language philosophy. These sources ground the author’s suggestion that the study of trust be taken up again, albeit along respecified analytic lines. Examples are given, both of an EM and conversation-analytic (CA) kind.

An Essay on Two Conceptions of Social Order: Constitutive Orders of Action, Objects and Identities vs Aggregated Orders of Individual Action

Rawls, A. W. — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:03:16 PST

I argue that there is a deep parallel between problems that John Rawls (1955) argued had developed in moral philosophy as a result of not recognizing the difference between two conceptions of rules, and problems that have developed in sociology as a result of not recognizing that there are two conceptions of social order. That most philosophers and sociologists have not appreciated this problem does not weaken the importance of the argument. In fact, I think that the misunderstandings which have resulted from lack of attention to constitutive practices, with research and policy implications effecting social, legal and justice issues in modern society, strengthen the original argument considerably.